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Personal Character and Firm Performance 
The Economic Implications of Having Fraudulent Board Members 
 
Unique proprietary data on Swedish board members reveal that a non-trivial proportion of 
board members in Swedish listed firms have been convicted of serious crimes. Analyzing the 
data shows that board members with personal fraudulent behavior are more likely to be 
males than females. We also find that the greater the proportion of fraudulent board 
members, the lower is the profitability and the higher are the earnings (and cash flows) 
volatility of the firm. However, the negative effect of fraudulent behavior on profitability is 
mitigated when fraudulent board members have a larger stake in the firm’s equity. Finally, 
we find that the earnings of firms with more fraudulent board members are lower and less 
value-relevant. Given the strong legal enforcement in Sweden, our results raise serious 
concerns about the effects of board members’ personal fraudulent behavior on firm 
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Personal Character and Firm Performance 
The Economic Implications of having Fraudulent Board Members 
 
1. Introduction 
Evidence from earlier studies suggests that the board of directors has a significant 
influence on corporate decisions, in particular by monitoring the decisions of top 
management (Larcker, Richardson and Tuna, 2007). As Fama and Jensen (1983) point out, 
corporate boards consist of individuals who collectively share their opinions and make 
decisions in board meetings. This raises the important question as to whether listed firms 
have a non-trivial number of fraudulent or unethical board members and whether such board 
members affect corporate performance and risk-taking. If board members do not obey the 
rules and norms of society, how can shareholders expect them to abide by corporate 
governance and other rules, to monitor management activities, and ensure that the firm is 
managed in the best interests of its shareholders? 
Surprisingly, evidence on whether board members themselves tend to engage in frauds 
or exhibit other personal fraudulent behavior is scarce. To the best of our knowledge, there 
are no published studies that have looked at the implications for corporate performance of 
having board members with criminal convictions. Our study examines whether and to what 
extent listed firms have board members who have been convicted of crimes or have 
exhibited other forms of fraudulent behavior. In addition, we investigate the effect of having 
fraudulent board members on firms’ performance, the propensity to take risks and the quality 
of financial reporting. Our analysis employs a unique and proprietary database on criminal 
records of all board members serving on the boards of Swedish publicly listed firms, 





Our results show that having board members who have been convicted of crimes is 
quite common among listed firms in Sweden. This is surprising, given the strong legal 
system in Sweden and the relatively low level of crime, compared to many other Western 
countries. In particular, 23% of the board members of the Swedish listed firms have been 
convicted of crimes and, consequently, sentenced to pay a fine or to unconditional or 
conditional prison sentences. As an indication of the pervasive influence of these board 
members, 85% of Swedish listed companies have at least one board member who has been 
convicted of some crime. We also find that 20% of Swedish listed firms have at least one 
board member whose name has been entered in a public non-payment record and that 15% 
of the firms have at least one board member who has served as a board member in more than 
three other firms that went into bankruptcy. These figures remain fairly stable over the whole 
sample period from 1999 to 2007, indicating that tightened corporate governance practices in 
the post-SOX period have not reduced the likelihood of fraudulent board members being 
appointed. Moreover, our results show that male board members, as opposed to females, are 
more likely to have been convicted of crimes. This is an interesting finding, given the recent 
focus of the corporate governance literature on the importance of gender diversity on boards. 
An analysis of profitability reveals that the proportion of fraudulent board members is 
associated with lower firm profitability. Also, companies with more fraudulent board 
members exhibit higher earnings volatility, suggesting that these firms engage in more risky 
projects without being fully compensated for taking such risks. However, board members’ 
personal ownership interest in the firm mitigates the negative effect of having fraudulent 
board members on corporate profitability. In addition, we find that that the power of earnings 
in explaining market-adjusted stock returns decreases with the proportion of fraudulent 





fraudulent board members and firm performance indicates that appointing fraudulent board 
members causes profitability to decline rather than vice versa.  
Taken together, our empirical results strongly support the conjecture that appointing 
individuals with past dishonest behavior to the highest levels of the organizational hierarchy 
may be more widespread than often believed, and that such appointments could have a 
serious negative effect on firm’s performance and risk-taking (e.g. Pech and Slade, 2007; 
and Jones et al., 2004). Our results support the view that, when developing new corporate 
governance measures, more emphasis should be placed on enhancing the quality of 
individuals serving within the corporate governance system, rather than on changing the 
governance system itself (e.g. Fischer et al., 2009). 
Our results have direct implications for future research on corporate governance and 
regulatory intervention. Clearly, more research on board members’ possible criminal records 
and other fraudulent behavior is important in understanding the role of corporate governance 
mechanisms in corporate decisions and consequent performance and risk-taking. A natural 
corollary to our study is to examine the effect of having fraudulent members on the boards of 
U.S. companies, where the overall crime rates are higher than in Sweden. In addition, it 
would be interesting to explore the role of fraudulent board members in recent financial 
reporting scandals and other corporate frauds. As for the regulatory implications, our results 
raise a question as to whether regulators should prohibit listed firms from appointing board 
members whose past dishonest behavior can be traced from official records. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the 
relevant literature on the role of the board in the governance mechanisms of the firm and in 
corporate frauds. Section 3 describes the sample, data sources and variables. In Section 4, we 






2. Institutional Background 
2.1. Board members lacking conventional morality  
Prior studies suggest that several aspects of individuals’ personal characteristics are 
related to their unethical or even criminal behavior. Typically, individuals showing 
hedonistic or over-confident behavior are more likely to commit crimes. For instance, Jones 
and Kavanagh (1996) show that individuals lacking conventional morality and being 
effective manipulators of others exhibit significantly more unethical behavioral tendencies 
than other people. Blickle and Schlegel (2006) argue that low behavioral self-control, high 
hedonism, high narcissism and high conscientiousness are positively related to the likelihood 
of committing business white collar crime. 
Is it then possible that individuals possessing these personal characteristics are 
appointed to the boards of listed firms, and what are the implications for corporate 
performance of appointing such board members? In fact, studies suggest that it may be 
surprisingly common that such individuals are appointed as senior executives. For instance, 
Pech and Slade (2007) suggest that firms sometimes appoint and promote to top managerial 
positions individuals who may be incompetent, narcissistic and manipulators. They conclude 
that these individuals can be characterized as organizational sociopaths, and they are 
sometimes promoted repeatedly until they reach the highest levels of the organizational 
hierarchy. In addition, Jones et al. (2004) suggest that organizational cultures actually 
tolerate and favor manipulative, egotistical and self-centered managerial behavior. If the 
organizational cultures described in these studies are widespread among firms, finding 





Interestingly, Daly (1989), Zahra et al. (2005) and Blickle and Schlegel (2006) suggest 
that males more often engage in white-collar crimes than females. In addition, corporate 
governance studies show that higher proportion of females on the board enhances the 
board’s ability to monitor management. For instance, Adams and Ferreira (2008) show that 
US companies with more gender-diverse boards invest more effort in monitoring activities. 
These results indicate that appointing females as board members may result in more 
effective monitoring, because, as compared to male board members, they are less likely to 
lack morality and exhibit other fraudulent behavior. 
Although board decisions are based on collective opinion sharing and decision-
making, the composition of the board, and particularly the personal characteristics of board 
members plays a significant role in the board’s actions (e.g. Raheja, 2005; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2008; and Fischer et al., 2009). In essence, a board consists of individuals and the 
composition of the board plays a crucial role in the effectiveness of the board as a 
governance mechanism (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Therefore, having low-moral 
and dishonest individuals on the board is likely to reduce a board’s ability to effectively 
monitor and advise management. In particular, board members with lower ethical standards 
who fail follow the standards and norms of society, would be expected to put less emphasize 
on corporate governance rules and principles that require board members to monitor and 
advise management.
1 These board members are more interested in enjoying their private 
benefits of being on the board such as monetary compensation and reputation rather than 
putting in the necessary effort. Studies even suggest that these personal characteristics may 
                                                            
1 Individuals’ tendency to engage in fraudulent behavior may also be associated with the so-called free rider 
problem often discussed in the corporate governance literature. The free rider problem refers to those board 
members who do not contribute much to the board’s work. This problem is more pervasive in large boards, 
where a single board member may play a relatively minor role in the joint decision-making. For instance, 







result in poor business decisions, because the individuals possessing these characteristics are 
not appointed to their positions because of their skills, but because they can manipulate those 
who promote them (e.g., Pech and Slade, 2007).  
The literature discussed above implies that the greater is the proportion of the low-
moral and fraudulent board members, the lower is the board’s effectiveness in monitoring 
and advising management. Since the board’s actions are based on collective decision-
making, these board members can have a serious negative influence on the decisions made 
by the board, resulting in lower profitability and cash flows. 
 
2.2. Excess risk-taking and sensation seeking board members 
While manipulative or sociopathic behavior are extreme examples of personal 
characteristics that may be associated with criminal convictions, a more common behavioral 
attribute that has been documented to be associated with criminal behavior is sensation 
seeking. Sensation seeking may be defined as an individual’s tendency to take physical, 
social, legal and financial risks simply for the sake of the thrill (Zuckerman, 1994). 
Sensation seekers are relatively fearless and take risks because of the thrill resulting from 
risk-taking, not because of the expected utility resulting from actions that involve greater 
risk. Earlier studies argue that criminal convictions such as traffic violations resulting from 
bad driving behavior may be a good empirical measure of sensation seeking (e.g. Jonah, 
1997). For instance, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) show that investors’ sensation seeking, 
measured by the number of speeding tickets they have received, is positively related to the 
frequency with which they trade their stocks. They argue that sensation seeking investors 





hold strategy creates a more varied and novel experience for these investors. Levenson 
(1990) argues that sensation seeking is associated with antisocial behavior.   
Sensation seeking and in particular, its behavioral attributes, are relevant to our study. 
Board members who have exhibited fraudulent behavior (e.g., have been convicted of 
crimes) may have higher tendency for sensation seeking behavior. These sensation seekers 
may advise or even require management to take unwarranted operating and financial risks. 
For instance, they may advice management to implement over-risky business strategies or 
enter over-risky investment projects. Since sensation seeking refers to actions that involve 
high risk without anticipated appropriate compensation for bearing such risk, these decisions 
are likely to result in poorer performance and higher earnings/cash-flow volatility. 
 
2.3. Do badly managed firms appoint fraudulent board members? 
While the literature discussed so far implies that that appointing fraudulent board 
members may cause weaker corporate performance, it is also possible that firms with weaker 
performance are more likely to appoint more fraudulent board members. First, these firms 
may not be able to appoint competent board members, as these individuals may be reluctant 
to serve on boards of troubled firms due to higher litigation exposure and negative reputation 
effects. Second, management of badly managed and under-performing firms may 
deliberately prefer weaker boards so that they can keep their positions despite the poor 
performance. Both explanations raise serious doubts as to the board’s ability to serve as an 
effective corporate governance mechanism. The empirical evidence on this issue is sparse, 
however, some evidence suggests that under-performing firms tend to appoint stronger, not 





performance by increasing the proportion of independent board members, therefore 
increasing the quality of the board as a corporate governance mechanism.  
 
3. Data and Variables 
3.1. Data sources 
Our sample includes non-financial companies listed on the Swedish stock market for 
the period 1999-2007 and monitored by Finansinspektionen (The Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority), i.e. the Swedish securities regulator. Table 1 includes information 
on our sample and on the effects of data restriction on the number of firms. Most of the 
analysis in this study is conducted using 334 firms. 
(Table 1 about here) 
The identity of board members in all listed Swedish companies was obtained from 
Finansinspektionen. We measure the tendency for fraudulent behavior by using data from 
three different sources: criminal convictions, entries in the public non-payment records and 
involvement in multiple corporate bankruptcies. While having been convicted of a crime is 
clearly an indication of fraudulent behavior, entries in the non-payment records or being a 
board member of several other bankrupt firms could result from reasons other than non-
ethical or fraudulent behavior. Nevertheless, they have implications for the board member’s 
credibility as a participant in a main corporate governance mechanism. For instance, a board 
member with serious personal financial problems resulting in entries in the non-payment 
record may not be considered a credible and responsible source of good judgment in 
monitoring and advising management. Similarly, being a board member of several other 
bankrupt firms could be an indication of a board member’s poor judgment or lack of 





board member’s potential fraudulent behavior. We therefore consider these three events – 
criminal convictions, entries in the non-payment record and being a board member of 
bankrupt firms – as indications of fraudulent behavior.  
Data on board members’ criminal convictions are taken from Brå (The Swedish 
National Council for Crime Prevention), a council within the Swedish judicial system 
formed by the Swedish government.
2 Our dataset from Brå contains information on criminal 
activity since 1973 for all Swedish citizens. More specifically, it contains information about 
individuals who have been found guilty by a court of law or received summary punishments 
by prosecutors.
3 The information on which the register is based is collected from all Swedish 
courts and prosecution authorities. For each board member registered, this dataset includes 
details of the crime and the punishment (the length of unconditional imprisonment, 
suspended sentences and monetary fines) and the details of the crime (for each crime an 
exact reference to the law or laws violated is given). The data base does not, however, 
contain information on minor offences like speeding and violation of local bylaws for which 
the punishment is an on-the-spot fine. Hence, the database only contains information about 
serious crimes committed. We deleted all crimes committed by board members before their 
18
th birthdays, as crimes committed prior to age 18 may not be good predictors of overall 
criminal behavior. The Appendix shows the numbers of convictions and convicted board 
members for the most commonly violated laws. The list of crimes committed includes 
serious crimes against the Penal Code such as theft and crimes against life and health. As 
                                                            
2 The purpose of Brå (www.bra.se) is to reduce crime and improve levels of safety in Sweden by producing 
data and disseminating knowledge on crime and crime prevention work. The Council also produces Sweden’s 
official crime statistics, evaluates reforms, conducts research and provides support to local crime prevention 
agencies. 
3 A criminal investigation does not always lead to a prosecution and trial, even though there is sufficient 
evidence to prove that the crime has been committed. If the suspect confesses the crime and it is clear what the 
punishment will be, the prosecutor may pronounce a so-called order of summary punishment (Source: Swedish 





described above, speeding, parking and similar violations of traffic laws are not included in 
our sample. 
Data on board members’ involvement in bankruptcy and records of nonpayment are 
from UC, Sweden’s leading business and credit information agency. According to Swedish 
law (SFS 2005:559), UC is not allowed to store information on individuals’ involvement in 
bankruptcy for more than five years. Since data on bankruptcy were collected at the 
beginning of 2009, we managed to obtain bankruptcy involvement data going back to 31 
December 2004. Information on non-payment is stored for only three years (SFS 
1973:1173). Our data on nonpayment was collected on 30 October 2008, so the first 
observation is from 30 October 2005.  
Finally, data on board members’ stockholdings were taken from Euroclear Sweden, 
which maintains an electronic database on the ownership of all Swedish stocks. For each 
investor, the dataset includes ownership records of all stocks owned at the end of July and 
December of each year (as data are recorded at six-month intervals). Data on board 
members’ other wealth (real estate, mutual funds, bank holdings and investments in debt 
securities) were obtained from the Swedish Tax authorities and are reported on an annual 
basis. Finally, accounting and market data for Swedish listed firms were obtained from 
Thomson’s Datastream. If the firm is missing from Thomson’s Datastream, we retrieved data 
from Bureau van Dijk global database, accessed via Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS), and the Six Trust database. 
 
3.2. Variable definitions 
To capture the effect of fraudulent behavior on the board of directors we construct 





ratio of board members convicted of crimes to the total number of board members for firm i 
at fiscal year-end t. Second, PAYMENTit is the number of board members having a non-
payment record divided by the total number of board members for firm i at fiscal year-end t. 
Third, BANKRUPTCYit is the number of firm i’s board members who have served on at least 
three boards of other bankrupt firms divided by firm i’s total number of board members at 
fiscal year-end t. Finally, FRAUDit is the sum of the variables CRIMEit, PAYMENTit and 
BANKRUPTCYit. This variable is a composite measure containing all the information 
regarding a board member’s potential fraudulent behavior.
4  
As discussed in Section 3.1., we include board members’ criminal convictions and 
non-payment records in FRAUDit because both measures clearly reflect a person’s tendency 
for unethical or antisocial behavior. In particular, it is well established in the criminology 
literature that one of the best predictor of future criminal acts is a history of criminal 
behavior (Gendreau et al., 1996). We include board members’ involvement in multiple 
bankruptcies in FRAUDit because bankruptcies are often caused by excessive risk-taking, 
which is more typical for individuals with fraudulent behavior, as discussed in Section 2. 
Also, while certain board members specialize in "saving" distressed firms, serving on 
multiple boards of companies that go bankrupt could raise serious doubts about an 
individual's ability to monitor and advise management. We nevertheless recognize the 
problematic nature of bankruptcy history as an indicator of fraudulent behavior and conduct 
robustness checks by excluding board members’ bankruptcy involvement from FRAUDit. 
These results are similar to those reported here, and are discussed in Section 4.4. 
                                                            
4 Some boards include members who have been convicted of crimes, have an entry in the non-payment record 
and have been involved in a bankruptcy. Consequently, FRAUDit may be greater than one. In these cases, we 
have truncated the value of the variable FRAUDit to one. We have also estimated all our models without this 





We also construct several other corporate governance variables frequently used in the 
literature. MALEit is the ratio of firm i’s male board members to total board members at year-
end t; BUSYit is the number of board members serving on three or more boards of listed 
Swedish firms divided by firm i’s total board members at year-end t; and INSIDERit denotes 
the proportion of board members who hold other positions in the firm in addition to being on 
the board (non-independent board members) at year-end t. In addition, we use data on board 
members’ total personal wealth to compute the proportion of total personal wealth invested 
in the firm. Specifically, we define OWNERit  as the average market value of the board 
members’ holdings in firm i at year t divided by the average value of their total wealth at 
year t (the market value of holdings in all insider and outsider stocks and the value of other 
wealth). Board size (BOARDSIZEit) is measured as the logarithm of the total number of 
board members for firm i at year-end t. 
Firm performance is measured using the following variables: (i) net income divided by 
market value of equity at the beginning of the year (EPit); (ii) operating cash (OPERCFit), 
measured as net income minus total accruals divided by average total assets for firm i at 
fiscal year-end t; (iii) return on assets (ROAit), measured as firm i’s earnings before interest 
and taxes divided by lagged total asset at fiscal year-end t; and (iv) return on equity (ROEit), 
measured as firm i’s net income divided by lagged shareholders’ equity at fiscal year-end t. 
These measures give qualitatively similar results, and we tabulate only those results for EPit 
and  OPERCFit. Total accruals (TOTACCRUALSit) needed to calculate OPERCFit are 
measured as: 
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We also use stock market returns in our empirical analysis. For each firm/year we 
compute annual stock returns from January to December. To adjust for market movements, 
we subtract the return on the Swedish market portfolio to obtain annual market-adjusted 
returns for each firm/year, denoted as MRETit. 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics on board members who have been convicted of 
crimes. As Panel A of the Table 2 shows, the proportion of convicted board members in 
Swedish listed companies is surprisingly high. From a total of 3,297 board members in our 
sample, 732 (22.2%) have been convicted in crimes and were sentenced to pay fines, and 82 
(2.5%) have been given unconditional and conditional prison sentences. In addition, many 
other board members have been convicted of white-collar and other serious crimes. Panel A 
of Table 2 shows that the total number of convicted board members is greater than the 
number of convicted board members for each crime category because some board members 
have been convicted more than once. For this reason, the numbers of convictions reported in 
Panel B are also greater than the numbers of convicted board members reported in Panel A.
5 
Clearly, having multiple crime convictions for one board member is an indication of 
fraudulent behavior. 
The results in Panel B of Table 2 also show that about 95% of all crime convictions are 
for male board members. In particular, all board members convicted of white collar crimes 
are males, while only 84% of board members in our sample are males. These results suggest 
that appointing male board members is more likely to increase the proportion of fraudulent 
                                                            
5 The number of board members who have been sentenced either to pay a fine or to unconditional or 
conditional prison sentences is 757, i.e. slightly smaller than the sum of these numbers reported in Table 2. This 
difference is also due to the fact that some board members have been convicted of more than one crime, and 





board members. Earlier studies suggest that a greater proportion of females on the board 
raises the level of corporate governance because greater gender distribution increases the 
diversity of board opinion. Our results suggest that another reason for these prior findings 
could be related to less fraudulent behavior and consequently lower agency costs, rather than 
diversity in opinion. Our findings on fraudulent behavior being more common for males than 
females are consistent with those reported in studies on individuals’ overall criminal 
behavior of individuals (e.g. Blicke et al., 2006). 
(Table 2 about here) 
Table 3 reports summary statistics on board members having an entry in a non-
payment record and board members who served on the boards of at least three other 
bankrupt companies. Having an entry on the non-payment record indicates that a board 
member has failed to meet his/her financial obligations. Regarding seats on the boards of 
other bankrupt companies, we consider only board memberships of private (non-listed) 
companies during the sample period. As in the case of criminal convictions, male board 
members are more likely to fail to meet their financial obligations and serve on other 
bankrupt companies than female board members.  
(Table 3 about here) 
Earlier studies argue that the general level of corporate governance has improved 
following recent accounting and other corporate scandals (e.g. Linck et al., 2008; Burkes, 
2009) due, for instance, to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and voluntary governance 
measures adopted by corporations. Linck et al. (2008) show that board structures changed 
post-SOX, primarily in the form of greater board independence. This behavior raises the 
question of whether the proportion of fraudulent board members has decreased over time. If 





the proportion of fraudulent board members may have decreased. Such a change would, 
however, require that the nominees for boards have voluntarily begun to disclose their 
criminal records, because the legislation in Sweden does not require them to disclose such 
information.  
Figure 1 shows the proportion of firms having at least one convicted board member 
each year. We cannot identify any systematic decrease in the proportion of convicted board 
members, suggesting that tightened corporate governance practices have not reduced the 
likelihood of fraudulent board members being appointed. Most likely this result indicates 
that firms are perhaps unaware of the convictions of nominated board members. 
Alternatively, firms may be aware of the fraudulent background of their board member 
candidates, but they have chosen to appoint these individuals to avoid tight monitoring. 
Although the latter explanation is implausible as it downplays the shareholders’ role in 
appointing board members, both explanations lead to weak monitoring of the firm 
management. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
Table 4 reports summary statistics on the variables used in the empirical analyses. As 
Panel A shows, the mean (median) proportion of convicted board members (CRIMEit) is 
25.7% (22.2%), which is quite significant. Also, this variable ranges from 0 to 1, indicating 
that some sample firms have no convicted board members, while some have appointed only 
convicted members. The mean (median) proportion of fraudulent board members (FRAUDit), 
represented here by the sum of CRIMEit, BANKRUPTCYit  and  PAYMENTit is 31.5% 
(27.3%).
6 The results show that having fraudulent, even convicted, board members is 
pervasive among Swedish listed firms. As Panel B shows, the mean proportion of male 
                                                            
6 As described earlier, some board members have been convicted of crimes, have an entry in the non-payment 
record and have been involved in a bankruptcy. Therefore, the sum of CRIMEit,  BANKRUPTCYit and 





board members is 86.7% and about 16% of board members have three or more other board 
memberships. The average board size is about eight members. On average, board members 
have invested 14% of their total wealth in the stock of the firm where they serve as board 
members. 
Panel C of Table 4 presents summary statistics for several firm-specific performance 
and other measures.
7 Over the sample period, the firms in our sample generated, on average, 
zero return on assets (ROAit). However, the median is 6.1%, suggesting that the distribution 
of ROAit is skewed to the left. Also, mean return on equity (ROE) is negative, but the median 
is 8.8% over the sample period. Similarly, the median of earnings divided by beginning of 
period share price (EPit) is 0.036, suggesting a median P/E ratio of 28. Operating cash flows 
are on average 2.2% of total assets (median = 6.9%). 
On average, 17.2% of total assets are financed by interest-bearing debt, as reflected by 
the mean of LEVERAGEit. The absolute value of total accruals is, on average, 8.2% of total 
assets. The average size of our sample firm is €900 million, smaller than a typical listed 
company in the US. Finally, market-adjusted stock return is on average 2.1% over the 
sample period, but the median is -4.7%. 
(Table 4 about here) 
Table 5 presents Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) correlations 
coefficients between our main variables including those between our crime-based corporate 
governance measures and the variables measuring the proportion of fraudulent board 
members. The results show that the variables measuring the fraction of fraudulent board 
members are positively correlated, suggesting that firms that appoint convicted board 
                                                            





members are more likely to appoint members with non-payment entries or members who 
have been involved in bankruptcies. 
Moreover, the variables that measure the fraction of fraudulent board members 
(FRAUDit,  CRIMEit,  BANKRUPTCYit, and PAYMENTit) are significantly negatively 
correlated with both measures of firm profitability (EPit and OPERCFit). This finding 
supports the view that board members’ personal fraudulent behavior is associated with a 
lower level of corporate governance and consequently lower levels of performance. In 
addition, all variables measuring the fraction of fraudulent board members are positively 
correlated with the proportion of male board members and negatively correlated with firm 
size. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Erhardt and Werbel, 2003), the results in Table 5 
suggest that the greater the proportion of male board members, the lower is firm profitability. 
(Table 5 about here) 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Determinants of the proportion of fraudulent board members 
We begin our analysis by identifying the determinants of the proportion of fraudulent 
board members. We use the following OLS regression model: 














BUSY MALE INDUSTRY YEAR FRAUD
   
    
  
       
   (1) 
 
The dependent variable is FRAUDit -- the proportion of fraudulent board members. 
Independent variables are: MALEit -- the proportion of male board members; BUSYit -- the 
proportion of board members with three or more board memberships in other listed Swedish 





LEVERAGEit -- interest-bearing debt divided by total assets; and SIZEit – the natural 
logarithm of total assets. We also include year (YEARs) and industry (INDUSTRYr) dummy 
variables based on 2-digit SIC codes. All t-values in the pooled regression are based on 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. Also, we take into account firm-level clustering 
in standard errors as in Petersen (2009). Specifically, we allow both a firm and time effect to 
be present in the panel data and address the time effect parametrically by including yearly 
dummies and then estimate standard errors clustered on the firm dimension.
8 In addition to 
estimating Equation (1) with pooled data, we report results using average coefficients and 
corresponding t-statistics from cross-sectional annual regressions as in Fama and MacBeth 
(1973). 
We include in Equation (1) variables that are expected to affect the likelihood of 
fraudulent board members being appointed. First, we include MALEit in the model because 
other studies have argued that males are more likely than females to be involved in frauds 
(e.g. Zahra et al., 2005; Blickle and Schlegel, 2006). Thus, appointing male board members 
is likely to increase the proportion of fraudulent board members. Second, the model includes 
BUSYit because “professional” board members serving on several other boards, are more 
likely to be screened by other firms as a part of the processes of selecting board members. 
Third, we include INSIDERit in the model because individuals who hold other positions in 
the firm are probably evaluated more thoroughly before being appointed to their positions. 
Hence, these board members are less likely to have been involved in fraudulent behavior. 
Fourth, LEVERAGEit is included in the model because firms with more leverage are likely to 
be under stricter control by lenders, which might reduce the likelihood of fraudulent board 
members being appointed. On the other hand, firms with a larger proportion of fraudulent 
                                                            





board members are more likely to engage in risky projects and borrow more. The sign of the 
coefficient on LEVERAGEit thus depends largely on the direction of causality. Fifth, SIZEit is 
included in the model as larger firms are more visible to the public and corporate governance 
decisions, such as appointing board members, may be under greater public scrutiny, hence 
reducing the likelihood of fraudulent board members being appointed. 
Table 6 provides the results of estimating Equation (1). The results show that the 
proportion of fraudulent board members increases with the proportion of male board 
members (MALEit) supporting earlier results on males being more likely to be involved in 
fraudulent activities (e.g., Zahra et al., 2005; Blickle and Schlegel, 2006). The proportion of 
board members who hold other positions in the firm (BUSYit) has a negative rather than 
positive effect on the proportion of fraudulent board members, but it is significant at the 0.05 
level only in the Fama-MacBeth analysis. This result indicates that professional board 
members, as opposes to others, could actually be more likely to show fraudulent behavior. 
We also find that the degree of leverage is positively associated with the proportion of 
fraudulent board members, although the coefficient on LEVERAGEit is significant at the 0.05 
level only in the Fama-MacBeth analysis. This result supports the argument that fraudulent 
board members tend to be excessive risk-takers, which is reflected in higher leverage. 
Finally, the proportion of fraudulent board members decreases with the size of the firm 
(SIZEit). This result is consistent with the view that large firms screen the backgrounds of 
candidates for board membership more thoroughly.  








4.2. Fraudulent board members and the performance of the firm 
Next, we examine the effect on the corporation’s performance of having board 
members with fraudulent behavior. We first divide the sample into quartile portfolios 
according to the proportion of fraudulent board members (FRAUDit). Table 7 presents the 
results for equal-sized portfolios (Panel A) and variable-sized portfolios (Panel B). 
As shown in Panel A, earnings deflated by lagged share price (EPit) decline 
monotonically as we move from a quartile portfolio with fewer fraudulent members to a 
quartile portfolio with more fraudulent members (the difference between the high and low 
portfolios is significant at the 0.01 level). Similarly, operating cash flows (OPERCFit) 
decrease with the proportion of fraudulent board members (the difference between the high 
and low portfolios is significant at the 0.01 level). These results, which are corroborated by 
analyzing variable-sized portfolios (Panel B), are consistent with the argument that boards 
with higher proportions of fraudulent board members are less effective in monitoring the 
firm, resulting in lower earnings and cash flows. 
Companies with larger proportions of fraudulent board members tend to be smaller, 
suggesting that these firms may be less visible to regulators and to the shareholders who 
appoint board members. Also, total accruals are significantly higher for companies with 
larger proportions of fraudulent board members, consistent with the argument that these 
companies produce lower quality financial statements. Similar results appear in Panel B 
when instead of equal-sized portfolios, we use variable-sized portfolios. 
We also examined the volatility of income and cash flows and found them to increase 
with the proportion of fraudulent board members. This result is consistent with the argument 
that fraudulent behavior is associated with taking unwarranted risks (sensation seeking). In 





compensated in terms of expected earnings and cash flows. In addition, we find that 
companies with more fraudulent board members experience lower stock returns (significant 
at the 0.10 level only in equal-sized portfolios), which provides more support for the 
argument of unwarranted risk taking. 
(Table 7 about here) 
We extend the univariate portfolio analysis using a multivariate regression analysis. In 
particular, we explore the economic implications of potentially weaker corporate governance 
arising from fraudulent board members by estimating the relation between the proportion of 
fraudulent board members and corporate profitability measures after controlling for other 
corporate governance variables. We expect profits to increase with the effectiveness of the 
board in monitoring and advising the firm. As fraudulent board members are expected to be 
less engaged in monitoring and advising the firm, and promote unwarranted risk taking, we 
expect a negative relation between the proportion of fraudulent board members and the 
profitability of the firm.  
We also expect that the governance problem arising from appointing fraudulent board 
members might be mitigated if these board members collectively own the equity of the firm. 
In such a case, they have an incentive to exert more effort in monitoring and advising 
management. We therefore expect that the classical solution to the principal-agent problem, 
i.e. the alignment of the agent’s interests with those of the principal through equity 
ownership (e.g. Jensen, 1993), applies here. The empirical research provides some evidence 
that board members with significant equity ownership in the firm are indeed more effective 
monitors. In particular, Bhagat and Black (2002) report that independent board members 
who hold significant stock positions add value to the firm, while other independent board 





board members increases the firm’s operating performance. Therefore, we expect that 
although fraudulent board members generally have weaker incentives to monitor the firm, 
their monitoring incentives increase with their economic stake in the firm (see also Beasley, 
1996). 
We test these predictions by estimating the following OLS model: 
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As discusses in Section 3.2, we use several measures of firm profitability as dependent 
variables in Equation (2), but tabulate the results only for two measures to save space. The 
first one is earnings per share divided by lagged share price (EPit) and the second one is 
operating cash flows (OPERCFit). The main explanatory variables in Equation (2) are 
FRAUDit (the proportion of fraudulent board members) and FRAUDit×OWNERit (the 
interaction variable between the proportion of fraudulent board members and their 
ownership interest in the firm). All other variables are as described in Equation (1). 
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are used to calculate t-values, and the firm-level 
clustering in standard errors is taken into account as described in Equation (1) and in 
Petersen (2009). 
 We include in Equation (2) the same control variables as in Equation (1), because these 
variables have been found to affect firm performance. First, MALEit is included in the 
equation, because prior studies find that gender diversity affects firm performance, although 
different studies report different signs for the effect. For instance, Erhardt and Werbel (2003) 
find a positive relationship between gender diversity and performance, whereas Adams and 





find that firms in which a majority of outside board members hold several directorships in 
other firms exhibit weaker profitability (e.g. Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Third, INSIDERit is 
included because it reflects the degree of board independence, and there are studies showing 
that board independence is associated with firm performance. The expected sign of the 
association, however, is controversial; while some studies suggest that firms benefit from a 
greater proportion of outside board members, other studies suggest that firms may benefit 
from boards with more insider representation (e.g. Drymiotes, 2007; Coles et al., 2008). 
Fourth, in addition to traditional corporate governance measures, Equation (2) controls for 
leverage and firm size, as these firm characteristics may be related to performance. Finally, 
to control for temporal and industry differences we include annual dummy variables (YEARs) 
and industry dummy variables (INDUSTRYr) based on 2-digit SIC codes. 
Table 8 reports the results of estimating Equation (2). The results show that the 
coefficients on FRAUDit, proportion of fraudulent board members, are negative and 
significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level for both measures of profitability. 
Moreover, the coefficients on EPit and OPERCFit range from -0.09 to -0.17 in alternative 
model specifications, suggesting that the effect of having fraudulent members on the board is 
economically significant. The results in Table 8 suggest that firms with relatively more 
fraudulent board members are less profitable. These results support the view that the 
corporate governance mechanisms are weaker in firms with relatively more fraudulent 
members, leading to less effective boards. 
The coefficients on the interaction variable FRAUDit×OWNERit are positive, as 
expected, and significant at the 0.05 level or better. These results suggest that while the 
proportion of fraudulent board members is negatively related to firm profitability, board 





the view that the governance problem arising from board members’ fraudulent behavior is 
mitigated if board members own a major stake in the firm’s equity. In addition, these results 
are consistent with those reported by Bhagat and Black (2002) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) 
who report that the board members’ stock ownership increases the firm performance. 
Regarding the other explanatory variables, the results in Table 8 show that none of the 
traditional corporate governance measures (MALEit, BUSYit and INSIDERit) have a consistent 
significant influence on profitability. An exception is a significantly positive slope on 
MALEit when the dependent variable is EPit, which supports Adams and Ferreira’s (2009) 
results that gender diversity has a negative effect on firm performance. Our results also show 
that leverage is negatively associated with profitability. Finally, firm size is positively 
associated with profitability, as reflected in the positive coefficients on SIZEit. 
(Table 8 about here) 
The results in Table 8 may be driven by serial correlation in the independent variables. 
We therefore estimate Equation (2) using one observation per firm
9. In particular, for each 
variable, we compute the mean variable over the entire sample period and include these 
means in equation (2). The results (not tabulated) confirm the negative association between 
firm performance and the proportion of fraudulent board members. Specifically, the 
coefficients on FRAUDi are negative (-0.14, and -0.14) and significant at the 0.01 level. 
These results support the view that appointing more fraudulent board members impairs firm 
performance.  
Since fraudulent board members are more likely to be males than females, it is also 
possible that the results in Table 8 are driven by gender diversity rather than fraudulent 
                                                            
9 We also estimate Equation (2) using the Fama-MacBeth method. The coefficients on FRAUDij are negative 
and significant at the 0.01 level, as in Table 8. The coefficient on the inter-action variable FRAUDij×OWNERij 
is only significant at the 0.10 level when EPij is used as the dependent variable and not significant at the 0.10 
level when OPERCFij is used as the dependent variable. The lack of significance of the interaction variable is 





behavior. We, therefore, estimated Equation (2) using firms with only male board members. 
The results (not tabulated) show negative coefficients (significant at the 0.01 level) on 
FRAUDit, as expected. The coefficients on FRAUDit×OWNERit are positive, as before, but 
significant only at the 0.10 level, probably due to smaller sample size. Thus, it is more likely 
that the results in Tables 8 are driven by fraudulent behavior than gender diversity in the 
board. 
The results thus far suggest that corporate performance is negatively associated with 
the proportion of fraudulent board members. However, the results are silent on the direction 
of causality. Is it the case that appointing fraudulent board members causes profits to decline 
or do companies with weaker performance tend to appoint weaker (more fraudulent) board 
members? To investigate this issue, we estimate the following vector autoregressive (VAR) 
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If the proportion of fraudulent board members causes profitability to decline but not vice 
versa, we would expect the coefficient β2 in Equation (3a) to be negative and the coefficient 
β2 in Equation (3b) to be zero. If, instead, lower profitability causes companies to appoint 
fraudulent board members, we would expect the coefficient β2 in Equation (3a) to be zero 





heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors to calculate t-values, and take into account the 
firm-level clustering in standard errors as described in Equation (1) and in Petersen (2009). 
The results in Table 9 show that the coefficients on FRAUDit in equation (3a) are 
negative (and significant at the 0.05 level) for both profitability measures. On the other hand, 
the coefficients on both profitability measures in Equation (3b), although negative as 
expected, are not significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. These results support the 
claim that appointing fraudulent board members causes profitability to decline. However, 
these result need to be interpreted with caution, because our VAR models are based on 
annual data over a sample period of only 9 years.  
(Table 9 about here) 
 
4.3. Fraudulent board members and earnings quality 
Next, we investigate whether the relevance of earnings in explaining annual stock 
returns is affected by the proportion of fraudulent board members. Earlier studies on the 
relation between earnings management and the level of corporate governance generally 
conclude that weak governance leads to opportunistic accounting discretion (e.g. Guidry et 
al., 1999; Klein, 2002). For instance, Klein (2002) finds that board independence is 
negatively related to the extent of earnings management among U.S. firms. Similarly, Bowen 
et al. (2008) find a positive association between poor governance quality and accounting 
discretion, but they also report evidence that accounting discretion due to poor governance is 
positively related to future firm performance.  
While prior studies have explored the relationship between governance quality and 
earnings management from various angles, we take a straightforward approach by looking at 





directors fails to monitor management, the firm is more likely to engage in earnings 
management activities that reduce the quality of earnings, which in turn is reflected in the 
reduction in the value relevance of earnings. In addition, firms influenced by fraudulent 
board members are more likely to engage in over-risky projects, which could also reduce the 
value-relevance of earnings (for example, due to losses). To examine this question we use a 
return-earnings model similar to that used in Easton and Harris (1991): 
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The dependent variable (MRETit) is annual market adjusted stock returns from January to 
December (firm’s annual return minus annual market return in Sweden). Independent 
variables are earnings levels divided by beginning of period share price (EPit) and earnings 
changes divided by beginning of period share price (ΔEPit). Both variables are expected to 
have positive coefficients.  
To address our research question, we allow the coefficients on earnings levels and 
earnings changes to vary by the proportion of fraudulent board members (FRAUDit). We also 
add firm size (log of total assets) and annual dummy variables as control variables, obtaining 
the following regression equation: 
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Table 10 presents the results of estimating Equation (5) using a pooled model with year 
fixed effects and for cross sectional estimation as in Fama and MacBeth (1973). In the 





we also take into account the firm-level clustering in standard errors as described in Equation 
(1) and in Petersen (2009). 
As the results reported in Table 10 show, the coefficients on earnings levels are 
positive, as expected, and significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level for both 
estimation methods. Also as expected, the coefficients on earnings changes are positive and 
significant at the 0.05 level or better in both estimation methods. However, the value-
relevance of earnings decreases with the proportion of fraudulent board members as reflected 
by the negative coefficients on it it FRAUD EP   (significant at the 0.05 level in both 
estimation methods). The coefficients on  it it FRAUD EP   are also negative, as expected, but 
only the coefficient from the pooled model is significant at the 0.05 level. Collectively, the 
results in Table 10 support the argument that boards with more fraudulent members are less 
effective in monitoring the firm, resulting not only in lower earnings, but also in lower 
quality of earnings. 
(Table 10 about here) 
Lastly, we examine the effect of appointing fraudulent board members on corporate 
risk. As argued earlier, one of the personal characteristics of fraudulent board members is 
sensation-seeking, resulting in unwarranted risk-taking. We therefore anticipate a positive 
association between the proportion of fraudulent board members and the volatility of 
earnings and cash flows. We use the following model: 
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We use three profitability measures in Equation (6). The first one is the standard 
deviation of earnings divided by lagged share price (EPit); the second variable is the standard 
deviation of operating cash flows divided by total assets (OPERCFit); and the third is the 
standard deviation of return on assets (ROAit). Each dependent variable is measured over the 
sample period (1999-2007). We limit the analysis to firms with at least three annual 
observations, resulting in a sample of 222 firms. Finally, each independent variable is the 
firm average over the entire sample period.  
The results of estimating Equation (6), which are reported in Table 11, show a positive 
association between the proportion of fraudulent board members and the volatility of profit 
measures. Specifically, the coefficients on FRAUDit are positive and significant at the 0.05 
level or better. The only other variable in the regressions with a significant coefficient is firm 
size. In particular, profit volatility is smaller in larger companies, as expected. Overall, the 
results in Table 11 suggest that companies with higher proportions of fraudulent board 
members experience higher volatility of profit measures. This result is consistent with the 
sensation-seeking argument, where fraudulent board members are more likely to engage in 
unwarranted risky projects resulting in higher profit volatility and lower overall profits.  
(Table 11 about here) 
 
4.4. Additional analyses and robustness checks 
So far, our measure of fraudulent behavior (FRAUDit) included involvement in 
multiple bankruptcies of other firms. We concede, however, that a board member's 
involvements in bankruptcies (even in multiple bankruptcies) may not be a good measure of 
fraudulent behavior. We therefore estimate all our regressions excluding BANKRUPTCYit 





Tables 8-11. The only exceptions are the coefficient on FRAUDit×OWNERit in the rightmost 
column of Table 8 and the coefficient on FRAUDit in Equation (3a) of Table 9, which are 
significant at the 0.10, level and the coefficient on EPit in Equation (3b) of Table 9, which is 
significant at the 0.05 level. Therefore, our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of 
involvement in bankruptcies in FRAUDit. 
In all our analyses, we have deflated earnings by the lagged stock price, as is often 
done in the literature. However, it is possible that investors anticipate the negative outcomes 
of having fraudulent board members (e.g., investors could anticipate the excessive risk-
taking of firms with fraudulent board members). In such a case, earnings deflated by lagged 
stock prices (EPit) may not fully reflect the effect of fraudulent board members on firm 
performance, because the negative effect of fraudulent boards on earnings is offset by the 
same effect on lagged stock price. To address this issue, we have estimated all our models 
using return-on-assets (ROAit) and return-on-equity (ROEit) instead of EPit. The results of 
these regressions (not tabulated) are similar to those reported in the tables. 
We have also estimated our models with fixed effect random coefficient models with 
autocorrelated residuals. Specifically, we allow firm-specific constant terms in the models, 
and also allow the regression residuals to follow an AR(1) process. The results from these 
analyses (not tabulated) are qualitatively similar to those reported in the tables with the 
following two exceptions: the coefficient on FRAUDit×OWNERit in the rightmost column of 
Table 8 and the coefficient on FRAUDit in Equation (3a) of Table 9 are not significant at the 
0.10 level.  
 





Surprisingly, many board members in Swedish listed companies have been convicted 
of serious crimes while many others have exhibited other types of fraudulent behavior. 
Recent legislative initiatives, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, have focused on preventing 
corporate frauds by placing more responsibilities on board members, executives and 
auditors. Perhaps the legislation should focus more on preventing individuals who have 
previously exhibited fraudulent behavior from holding key positions in publicly listed 
corporations. While in many countries convicted criminals cannot become external auditors 
(i.e., certified public accountants), to the best of our knowledge there are no such limitations 
on the appointment of corporate board members. 
What are the economic implications of appointing convicted criminals to the boards of 
directors of listed companies? Given the importance of the board as a corporate governance 
mechanism, it is quite surprising to find little or no research on this issue. We address this 
issue by using data on the criminal records of all board members in Swedish listed firms. 
First, we document the extent to which firms have individuals with prior fraudulent behavior 
on their boards of directors. Specifically, we compute the proportion of board members who 
have been convicted of serious crimes, have an entry in the public non-payment record and 
have served as board members in three or more bankrupt firms. Our results show that 
appointing board members who have been convicted of crimes is surprisingly common 
among listed firms in Sweden, a country where the rule of law is strong and the general level 
of crime is lower than in many other Western countries. To illustrate, 23% of board members 
in Swedish listed firms have been convicted of crimes and sentenced to pay a fine or to 
unconditional or conditional prison sentences. Consequently, 85% of Swedish listed 
companies have at least one board member who has been convicted of a crime. We also find 





record and who have served as board members in three or more other bankrupt firms. 
Furthermore, our results show that male board members are more likely than females to 
commit crimes. This finding is interesting given the focus of recent corporate governance 
studies on the importance of gender diversity in boards. 
Next, we examine the economic implications of having fraudulent members on the 
board. We expect that companies with more fraudulent board members have weaker 
corporate governance mechanisms leading to lower profitability. Also, we expect these 
companies to engage in riskier projects without being properly compensated for taking those 
risks (sensation seeking). As expected, we find that the greater the proportion of fraudulent 
board members is the lower is the profitability and the higher is the volatility of earnings. In 
addition, our results show that board members’ personal ownership interest in the firm 
mitigates the negative effect of having fraudulent board members on firm profitability. We 
also expect the quality of earnings to be negatively associated with the proportion of 
fraudulent board members. Consistent with our expectation, we find that the power of 
earnings in explaining stock returns is weaker in companies with more fraudulent board 
members. These results support our argument that appointing fraudulent board members 
impairs the ability of the board to monitor and advise management, resulting in lower profits, 
unwarranted risk-taking, and lower quality financial reporting. Finally, the results of 
analyzing the direction of causality between the proportion of fraudulent board members and 
firm performance indicate that appointing fraudulent board members leads to lower 
profitability rather than vice versa. 
The policy implication of our study is obvious. Appointing fraudulent individuals to 





excessive risk and lower quality reporting. To reduce this cost, companies should avoid 
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Sample selection and the Effects of Data Restrictions 
 




All listed Swedish companies  650  3,560 
    
Non-financial companies  567  3,061 
    
Companies with complete accounting and other data  369  2,218 
    
Companies with lagged variables, accruals and after 
truncating 1% on each side as outliers. 
334 1,767 
    
Companies with at least three observations for the 
purpose of calculating standard deviation of earnings 
and operating cash flows. 
222 NA 






Board Members' Criminal Convictions (Swedish listed firms during 1999-2007)* 
 
    White-collar crimes  Other crimes 
against the Penal Code 
Other crimes  Total 
   N % N  % N  %  N  % 
Panel A: Number of convicted board members 
                
Fine sentences  40  100.0  105  100.0  635  100.0  732  100.0
 Males  40  100.0  95  90.5  609  95.9  696  95.1
 Females  0  0.0  10  9.5  26  4.1  36 4.9
                  
Imprisonment 26  100.0  35  100.0  28  100.0 82  100.0
 Males  26  100.0  34  97.1  28  100.0 81  98.8
 Females  0  0.0  1  3.9  0  0  1  1.2
                  
Panel B: Number of convictions 
                  
Fine sentences  41  100.0  119  100.0  860  100.0 1,020  100.0
 Males  41  100.0  105  88.2  831  96.6 977  95.8
 Females  0  0.0  14  11.8  29  4.4 43 4.2
                  
Imprisonment 30  100.0  41  100.0  30  100.0 101  100.0
 Males  30  100.0  40  97.6  30  100.0 100  99.0
 Females  0  0.0  1  2.4  0  0.0 1  1.0
 
*Note: The table provides descriptive statistics of criminal convictions of board members in Swedish listed companies. The sample includes 
Swedish listed firms during 1999-2007. The term ‘Imprisonment’ refers to convictions resulting in either unconditional or suspended sentences 


















1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007







Board Members Marked in the Non-payment or Bankruptcy Records* 
 
     Non-payment records    Bankruptcy records 
   N %    N  % 
Total 97  100.0    68  100.0 
 Males  89  91.8   67  98.5 




The table provides information on the number of board members in Swedish listed 
companies who have been entered in the non-payment records and who served as board 






Characteristics of Sample Firms* 
 
 Mean  Median Std.  Min  Max 
 
Panel A: Personal fraudulent behavior variables 
          
CRIMEit  0.257 0.222  0.195  0.000  1.000 
BANKRUPTCYit  0.030 0.000  0.072  0.000  0.500 
PAYMENTit  0.038 0.000  0.089  0.000  1.000 
FRAUDit  0.315 0.273  0.227  0.000  1.000 
 
Panel B: Other corporate governance variables 
          
MALEit  0.868 0.889  0.140  0.000  1.000 
BUSYit  0.157 0.143  0.160  0.000  1.000 
BOARDSIZEit  2.052 2.079  0.393  0.693  2.996 
INSIDERit  0.020 0.000  0.058  0.000  0.500 
OWNERit  0.143 0.010  0.230  0.000  1.000 
          
Panel C: Firm specific variables 
          
ROAit  0.002 0.061  0.209  -1.311  0.503 
ROEit  -0.029 0.088 0.594  -12.266  5.519 
EPit  -0.019 0.036 0.206  -1.188  0.500 
OPERCFit  0.022 0.069  0.186  -0.922  0.429 
LEVERAGEit  0.172 0.145  0.159  0.000  0.814 
TOTACCRUALSit  0.081 0.058  0.079  0.000  0.570 
SIZEit  6.794 6.562  2.131  1.353  12.654 




1.  The table provides descriptive statistics on the main variables in our analysis. The 
sample includes 334 listed Swedish firms (1,767 firm-year observations) during the 
period 1999-2007. 
 
2.  Variables are defined as follows: 
-  CRIMEit – The ratio of the number of board members convicted of crimes to the total 
number of board members for firm i at the end of year t. 
-  BANKRUPTCYit – The number of board members serving as board members in three 
or more other bankrupt firms divided by the total number of board members for firm 
i at year-end t. 
-  PAYMENTit – The number of board members having a non-payment record divided 
by the total number of board members for firm i at year-end t. 
-  FRAUDit – The sum of CRIMEit, BANKRUPTCYit and PAYMENTit. 





-  BUSYit – The proportion of board members with three or more board memberships in 
the listed Swedish firms for firm i at the end of year t. 
-  BOARDSIZEit – The logarithm of the total number of board members for firm i at 
year-end t. 
-  INSIDERit – The proportion of board members who hold executive positions in the 
firm in addition to being on the board. 
-  ROAit – Return on total asset, measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided 
by lagged total asset for firm i at year-end t. 
-  ROE – Return on equity, measured as net income divided by shareholders’ equity. 
-  EPit – Firm i's earnings per share for period t divided by beginning of period share 
price. 
-  TOTACCRUALSit – Total accruals for firm i at year-end t, measured as change in 
inventory plus change in receivables plus change in other current assets minus 
change in payables minus change in other current liabilities minus depreciation. 
-  OPERCFit – Net income minus total accruals, deflated by average total assets. 
-  LEVERAGEit – Interest bearing debt divided by total assets. 
-  SIZEit – Log of total assets. 
-  MRETit – Annual market-adjusted stock return measured from January to December 
of each year.  
 
3.  We have truncated the distributions of EPit,  OPERCFit and MRETit by deleting 








Correlation Matrix for the Main Variables* 
 
    1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
1  FRAUDit    0.86 0.41 0.46 0.22 0.08 0.04 -0.02  -0.19  -0.16  -0.02  -0.18 
2  CRIMEit  0.86    0.08 0.19 0.20 0.08 0.03 -0.00  -0.13  -0.12 0.04 -0.13 
3  BANKRUPTCYit  0.36 0.04    0.07  0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.20 -0.13 -0.10 -0.21 
4  PAYMENTit  0.45  0.12 0.05    0.11 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.11  -0.06  -0.03  -0.04 
5  MALEit  0.22  0.17 0.08 0.11    0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.05  -0.07 0.02 -0.15 
6  OWNERit  0.32  0.30 0.01 0.08 0.00    -0.03 0.04 0.09 0.06 -0.04 0.05 
7  BUSYit  0.02  0.02  -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05    -0.13 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.39 
8  INSIDERit  -0.01  -0.01  0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.13    0.01 0.02 -0.02  -0.05 
9  EPit  -0.16  -0.09  -0.16  -0.10  -0.07 0.11 0.13 0.01    0.56 0.02 0.32 
10  OPERCFit  -0.13  -0.09  -0.12  -0.03  -0.10 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.60    0.04 0.38 
11  LEVERAGEit  -0.03  0.04  -0.08  -0.01  -0.01  0.03 0.09 -0.3 0.13 0.00    0.34 
12  SIZEit  -0.17  -0.10  -0.20 0.01 -0.20 0.13 0.43 -0.01 0.41 0.36 0.42   
 
*Note: The table presents pair-wise Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) correlations for the main variables. Correlations 
above 0.06 and below -0.06 are significant at the 0.05 level. The sample includes 334 listed Swedish firms (1,767 firm-year observations) 





Determinants of the Proportion of Fraudulent Board Members 
(FRAUDit)* 
 







      
Intercept  ? 0.11  0.06 
     (1.48)    (1.14) 
      
MALEit  +  0.27 0.33 
    (3.88)+    (7.81)+ 
      
BUSYit  - 0.13  0.13 
   (1.92)  (2.55)* 
       
INSIDERit  - -0.11  -0.09 
      (-0.75)    (-0.92) 
       
LEVERAGEit  ? 0.09  0.10 
      (1.44)  (2.30)* 
      
SIZEit  -  -0.02 -0.02 
    (3.42) (3.33) 
      
Yearly & industry dummy variables   YES  NO 
Adjusted R
2   0.14  0.26 














INSIDER BUSY MALE INDUSTRY YEAR FRAUD
  
     
 









The dependent variable is FRAUDit (the proportion of fraudulent board members). 
Independent variables are: MALEit (the proportion of male board members); BUSYit (the 
proportion of board members with three or more board memberships in listed Swedish 
firms); INSIDERit (the proportion of board members who hold other positions in the 
firm);  LEVERAGEit (interest-bearing debt divided by total assets); and SIZEit (the 
logarithm of total assets). 
 
2. The pooled regression is estimated using pooled data with year and industry fixed-effects. 





errors. We also take into account the firm-level clustering in standard errors as in Petersen 
(2009). Specifically, we allow both a firm and time effect to be present in the panel data 
and address the time effect parametrically by including yearly dummies and then estimate 
standard errors clustered on the firm dimension.  
 
3. In addition to pooled regression, we report results using average coefficients and 
corresponding  t-statistics from cross-sectional annual regressions as in Fama and 
MacBeth (1973).  In the Fama-MacBeth regressions, we compute t-values based on nine 
annual observations. 
 








Firm Characteristics by Level of Fraudulent Board Members 
Univariate Portfolio Analysis* 
 
  Low 2  3 High  t-test  P-value 
        High-Low   
Panel A: Equal-sized portfolios sorted by FRAUDit 
# of firms  83 84  83 84     
EPit  0.003 -0.003  -0.015 -0.133 4.54 (0.00) 
OPERCFit  0.030   0.048   0.026  -0.063  3.40 (0.00) 
SIZEit  6.827   6.622   6.660   5.477  4.08 (0.00) 
TOTACCRUALSit  0.076   0.089   0.081   0.114  -3.85 (0.00) 
MRET  0.026 -0.006  -0.004 -0.078 1.92 (0.06) 
Std(EPit)  0.082   0.117   0.145   0.200  -4.69 (0.00) 
Std(OPERCFit)   0.098   0.099   0.123   0.149  -3.23 (0.00) 
Panel B: Variable-sized portfolios sorted by FRAUDit 
  <30% 30%-50% 50%-70% >70%     
# of firms  169 90  50  25     
EPit  0.002 -0.033  -0.093 -0.199 4.54 (0.00) 
OPERCFit  0.040   0.018  -0.061 -0.075 3.40 (0.00) 
SIZEit  6.744   6.638   5.481   4.984  4.08 (0.00) 
TOTACCRUALSit  0.082   0.084   0.115   0.148  -3.84 (0.00) 
MRET  0.013 -0.019  -0.113   0.001 0.16  (0.87) 
Std(EPit)  0.098   0.150   0.193   0.228  -4.69 (0.00) 




1.  Panel A presents mean variables for quartile-portfolios sorted according to the proportion 
of fraudulent board members (FRAUDit). Panel B presents mean variables for variable-
sized portfolios for different levels of FRAUDit. The table reports average values for each 
variable along with the t-test (and corresponding p-values) for the difference in means 
between the extreme portfolios. See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
 
2.  The sample includes Swedish listed companies with sufficient data (1,767 firm year 
observations) over the period 1999-2007.  
 
3.  Time-series averages for the variables EPit, OPERCFit,  SIZEit, and FRAUDit are 
calculated for each firm over the sample period. Standard deviations – Std(EPit) and 
Std(OPERCFit) – are calculated for each firm over the sample period. When calculating 
these volatility measures, each firm has to have at least three years of data, which reduces 
the number of firms for which we can have the volatility measures. Then we classify each 






The Association between Profitability and the Proportion of 
Fraudulent Board Members (FRAUD)* 
 
  Exp.  Dependent Variable  Dependent Variable 
  Sign EPit  EPit  OPERCFit  OPERCFit 
FRAUDit  -  -0.11 -0.17 -0.09  -0.13 
      (-3.63)+    (-4.48)+   (-3.07)+    (-3.81)+ 
         
FRAUDit x OWNERit  +  --- 0.47 ---  0.33 
     (3.09)+    (2.04)* 
         
OWNERit  ?  ---  -0.06  ---  -0.06 
     (-1.22)    (-1.30) 
         
MALEit  ? 0.11  0.09 0.05  0.05 
      (2.19)*  (1.91) (1.15)  (0.99) 
         
BUSYit  ?  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04  -0.03 
    (-1.05) (-0.98) (-0.97)  (-0.95) 
         
INSIDERit  ?  0.06 0.04 0.10  0.09 
    (0.50) (0.36) (1.15)  (1.05) 
         
LEVERAGEit  ? -0.20 -0.19 -0.17  -0.16 
       (-4.47)+  (-4.21)+    (-4.12)+  (-3.94)+ 
         
SIZEit  ?  0.03 0.03 0.04  0.04 
      (8.51)+    (8.70)+    (9.28)+    (9.35)+ 
         
Year and industry 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES 
Adjusted R
2   0.21 0.22 0.23  0.24 




1.  The Table provides results for estimating Equation (2). The model is: 
,
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The dependent variables are EPit (earnings deflated by the beginning of year market 
value of equity) and OPERCFit (operating cash flows deflated by total assets) in the 
current and subsequent periods. Independent variables are: FRAUDit (the proportion of 





(the proportion of board members with three or more board memberships in listed 
Swedish firms); INSIDERit (the proportion of board members who hold other positions 
in the firm); LEVERAGEit (debt divided by total assets); and SIZEit (the logarithm of 
total assets). 
 
2.  The regressions are estimated using pooled data with year and industry fixed-effects. All 
t-values in the pooled regression are based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard 
errors. We also take into account the firm-level clustering in standard errors as in 
Petersen (2009). Specifically, we allow both a firm and time effect to be present in the 
panel data and address the time effect parametrically by including yearly dummies and 
then estimate standard errors clustered on the firm dimension. 
 








Causal Association between Profitability  
and the Proportion of Fraudulent Board Members (FRAUD)* 
 
   
Exp.
Dependent Variable 
Equation (3a)                  Equation (3b) 
  Sign EPit+1  OPERCFit+1  FRAUDit+1  FRAUDit+1 
EPit  +/- 0.28  ---  -0.04 --- 
   (7.25)*  ---  (-1.68) --- 
          
OPERCFit  +/- ---  0.38  ---  -0.04 
   ---  (9.21)*  ---  (-1.40) 
          
FRAUDit  -/+ -0.08  -0.05  0.74  0.75 
      (-2.85)*    (-2.01)*  (29.81)*    (29.89)* 
         
MALEit  ?  -0.01 0.02  0.06  0.06 
   (-0.14)  (0.35)  (1.80)  (1.72) 
          
BUSYit  ?  0.00 -0.02  0.02  0.02 
   (0.13)  (-0.57)  (0.62)  (0.60) 
          
INSIDERit  ?  0.00 0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
   (0.02)  (0.25)  (-0.10)  (-0.18) 
          
LEVERAGEit  ?  -0.03 0.05  0.02  0.02 
      (-0.67)  (1.60)  (0.77)    (0.87) 
          
SIZEit  ? 0.01  0.02  -0.00 -0.00 
      (3.38)+    (4.61)+  (-0.97)    (-0.96) 
          
Year and Industry dummies   YES  YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R
2   0.29  0.25  0.61  0.61 




The table presents results for estimating Equations (3a) and (3b). The purpose of the analysis 
is to establish the direction of causality. Variables and estimation method are as in Table 7. 






The Effect of FRAUD on the Value-Relevance of Earnings* 
 




FRAUDit  ? -0.02  0.01 
   (-0.30)  (0.08) 
      
EPit  + 1.03  1.24 
      (7.40)+    (6.60)+ 
      
FRAUDit x EPit  - -0.47 -1.03 
      (-2.11)*    (-2.81)* 
      
ΔEPit  + 0.43  0.57 
      (4.42)+    (2.42)* 
      
FRAUDit x ΔEPit  - -0.54 -0.66 
      (-3.99)+  (-1.66) 
      
SIZEit  ?  -0.00 -0.00 
    (-0.13) (-0.37) 
      
Year dummies   YES NO 
Adjusted R
2   0.16 0.19 
Observations   1,767  9 
*Notes: 
 
1.  The table presents results for estimating Equation (5). The model is: 
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The dependent variable (RETit) is annual market adjusted stock returns from January to 
December (firm’s annual return minus annual market return in Sweden). Independent 
variables include FRAUDit (the percentage of fraudulent board members); EPit (earnings 
levels per share divided by beginning of period share price), ΔEPit (earnings changes 
divided by beginning of period share price); interaction variables between FRAUDit and 
both earnings variables; and SIZEit (log of total assets). 
 
2.  The pooled regression is estimated using pooled data with year and industry fixed-
effects. All t-values in the pooled regression are based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted 
standard errors. We also take into account the firm-level clustering in standard errors as 
in Petersen (2009). Particularly, we allow both a firm and time effect to be present in the 
panel data and address the time effect parametrically by including yearly dummies and 






3.  In addition to pooled regression, we report results using average coefficients and 
corresponding  t-statistics from cross-sectional annual regressions as in Fama and 
MacBeth (1973).  In the Fama-MacBeth regressions, we compute t-values based on nine 
annual observations. 
 






The Association between the Volatility of Earnings and Cash Flows and 
the Proportion of Fraudulent Board Members (FRAUDit) 
 
  Expected 
Sign 
Std(EPit)  Std(OPERCFit) Std(ROAit) 
FRAUDi  + 0.15  0.07  0.09 
      (2.69)+    (2.24)*    (2.19)* 
       
MALEi  ?  -0.10 -0.05  -0.07 
   (-1.36)  (-1.13)  (-1.35) 
        
BUSYi  ?  -0.02 0.04 -0.00 
   (-0.27) (0.91)  (-0.08) 
        
INSIDERi  ?  0.02 -0.04  -0.00 
   (0.20)  (-0.53)  (-0.02) 
        
LEVERAGEi  + 0.24  -0.06 -0.08 
      (3.32)*    (-1.84)    (-1.76) 
        
SIZEi  - -0.03  -0.02 -0.02 
      (-4.84)+    (-5.11)+    (-4.82)+ 
        
Industry dummies   YES  YES YES 
Adjusted R
2   0.26  0.35 0.35 




1.  The table presents results for estimating Equation (6) using a sample of listed Swedish 
companies. The model is: 
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The dependent variables are the standard deviation of earnings divided by lagged share 
price,  Std(EPi), standard deviation of operating cash flows divided by total assets, 
Std(OPERCFi), and standard deviation of return on assets, Std(ROAi), and. We required 
at least three observations per firm in order to calculate standard deviations (222 firms). 
 
2.  Independent variables are FRAUDi (average firm proportion of fraudulent board 
members); MALEi (average firm proportion of male board members); BUSYi (average 
firm proportion of board members with three or more board memberships in other listed 
Swedish firms); INSIDERi (average firm proportion of board members who hold 
executive position in the firm); LEVERAGEi (average debt divided by total assets); and 






3.  Regressions are estimated with industry fixed-effects. All t-values are based on 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. Also, we take into account the firm-level 
clustering in standard errors as in Petersen (2009). 
 






Appendix - Numbers of Convictions and Convicted Board Members by Each Law Broken 
 
Code Title  #  of 
convictions







1951:649  Act on Criminal 
Responsibility for 
Certain Traffic Offences 
257  189  Drunk or reckless driving  Fines  2 years in 
prison 
1972:603 Road  Traffic 
Promulgation 
177 116  Various  traffic-related 
crimes, all types of vehicles 
Fines Fines 
1998:1276 Vehicle Ordinance  121  70  Various traffic related 
crimes, all kinds of vehicles 
Fines Fines 
1960:418  Act on Criminal 
Responsibility for 
Smuggling 
107 80  Importing/Exporting  goods 
without proper payment of 
duty or other taxes 
Fines  6 years in 
prison 
Ch. 8  Theft, Robbery, Other 
Stealing 
57  40  Shoplifting, robbery  Fines  10 years in 
prison 
1972:595 Vehicle  Promulgation  36  31  Driving a car with a driving 
ban 
Fines Fines 
Ch. 3  On Crimes against Life 
and Health 
26 19  Assault,  manslaughter  Fines Life 
Imprisonment 
Ch. 9  Fraud and Other Acts of 
Dishonesty 
23  12  Fraud  Fines  6 years in 
prison 
1986:300  Sea Traffic Ordinance  26  19  Violation of international 
sea traffic rules 
Fines Fines 
Ch. 12  Crimes Inflicting 
Damage 
16  10  Damage to public property  Fines  4 years in 
prison 
1941:967  The Conscription Act  14  9  Failure to appear for 
military service 





1971:69  Tax Offence Act  11  9  Incorrect information to tax 
authorities, tax erasion 
Fines  6 years in 
prison 
1956:617  Public Order Act  9  7  Arranging public meetings 
without permit 
Fines 6  months  in 
prison 
Ch. 11  Crime Against Creditors  9  5  Crime against creditors  Fines  6 years in 
prison 
Ch. 17  On Crime Against 
Public Activity 
9  3  Obstruction of police  Fines  8 years in 
prison 
Ch. 4  On Crimes Against 
Liberty and Peace  
8 8  Unlawful  coercion  Fines  Lifetime 
Imprisonment 
1988:327  Vehicle Tax Act  8  8  Driving a vehicle without 
paying vehicle tax  
Fines 6  months  in 
prison 
1990:1342 Insider Act  8  7  Insider trading based on 
non-public information 
Fines  2 years in 
prison 
 All  others  155  115       